Industry directory · Evidence before marketing
Browse official company and technology links for organizations supplying sensing, command-and-control, autonomy, guidance, communications, and defensive systems connected by public evidence to operational users or fielded programs.
Answer-first summary
The directory includes companies with public evidence linking a representative sensor, command, autonomy, guidance, communications, or defensive product to an operational user, fielded system, delivery, or documented exercise.
Read the supporting sectionNo. Many listed technologies use deterministic automation, sensor fusion, networking, navigation, or operator decision support. The page separates those functions from autonomous engagement authority.
Read the supporting sectionNo. They are direct links to official company and technology pages for research convenience. Product claims remain attributed and supporting evidence is listed separately.
Read the supporting sectionResearch boundary
This directory is a research aid, not a purchasing guide, ranking, partnership list, investment recommendation, or certification. Official company pages explain what a provider says about its own products. Separate source records show the bounded public evidence used to connect a technology to real-world deployment, delivery, service, or exercise activity.
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Provider directory
Search company names, representative technologies, operational connections, functions, regions, or limitations. Evidence labels describe the public basis for inclusion—not the quality or morality of a company.
01 · United States
The U.S. Navy documents Phalanx as a fielded close-in defense system. Raytheon describes the system as performing search, detection, threat evaluation, tracking, engagement, and kill assessment, with sea and land deployments.
This record does not establish one control mode for every operator, platform, mission, or software baseline, and it does not imply that every automated function uses machine learning.
Directory record reviewed
02 · United States
The U.S. Navy identifies Lockheed Martin as the Aegis combat-system integrator for the DDG 51 class, which has been deployed since 1991. Aegis connects sensors, command functions, and weapons across defensive missions.
Aegis and LRASM have many configurations and classified functions. Public descriptions do not reveal all automation settings, engagement rules, intervention paths, or operational software behavior.
Directory record reviewed
03 · United States
U.S. Army and company-controlled sources describe IBCS as a fielded command-and-fire-control capability. Public records identify fielding in the United States and Poland and continued integration with additional sensors and effectors.
Fielding does not establish that every correlation, prioritization, or firing function uses AI, nor does it disclose operator permissions, local doctrine, or classified performance.
Directory record reviewed
04 · United States
The U.S. Department of Defense has awarded current Maven Smart System contracts to Palantir, and the U.S. Army selected Palantir for the TITAN ground-station prototype. These are real government programs connecting data, analysis, and operational workflows.
Procurement and deployment do not establish autonomous weapon release. Detailed models, thresholds, workflows, mission uses, and error rates are not fully public.
Directory record reviewed
05 · United States
The U.S. Army has announced an enterprise procurement framework for Anduril technologies and publicly described soldiers employing Ghost X aircraft with Lattice OS. Army and Guard reporting also documents Lattice-based counter-drone sensor integration.
Operational use of a platform or command layer does not establish autonomous lethal authority, and company language about accelerating a kill chain remains a manufacturer description.
Directory record reviewed
06 · United States
L3Harris states that it delivered and installed VAMPIRE systems for Ukrainian defense support in 2023 and has received follow-on U.S. Department of Defense orders. The system combines sensing, mission management, and effectors.
The cited operational statements are company-controlled. They do not independently verify all mission outcomes, AI functions, control arrangements, or performance claims.
Directory record reviewed
07 · United States
GA-ASI describes the MQ-9 family as fielded with U.S. and allied operators and supporting long-duration ISR and targeting missions. Public company material documents routine government operation and extensive operational use.
MQ-9 systems are remotely piloted aircraft with automated subsystems. Their inclusion does not imply autonomous weapon release, and company hour or performance figures are not independent audits.
Directory record reviewed
08 · United States
AeroVironment describes Switchblade 300 as deployed by the U.S. Army for more than a decade and used in Ukraine, while current U.S. orders continue production and fielding of the family.
Company statements about deployment or combat performance do not establish the selected control mode in a particular event or autonomous selection of a target.
Directory record reviewed
09 · Israel
Rafael describes Iron Dome as operational since 2011 and identifies its deployment with Israeli and U.S. users. Public records establish a real fielded defensive chain built from radar, battle management, launchers, and interceptors.
Manufacturer performance claims are not independent audits. Public evidence does not establish one universal authorization setting, software method, or operating doctrine for every user and deployment.
Directory record reviewed
10 · Israel
IAI describes the ELM-2084 radar as operational and combat-proven in Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and BARAK configurations. Its HARPY product is also publicly described by the manufacturer as an operational autonomous anti-radiation loitering munition.
Public product descriptions do not disclose all track-processing methods, target libraries, confidence thresholds, safeguards, abort functions, customer settings, or incident-level operating modes.
Directory record reviewed
11 · Israel
mPrest identifies itself as the developer of Iron Dome command-and-control software and describes that software as operational with the Israel Defense Forces. Rafael also identifies mPrest as an Iron Dome program partner.
The public material does not expose operational code, decision logic, local authorization settings, failure handling, or independently audited performance.
Directory record reviewed
12 · Israel
Elbit describes Torch-X as a multi-domain C4ISR and battle-management family and has publicly documented deployment of a Torch-X-based application during a NATO interoperability exercise. Its Hermes aircraft are also fielded with multiple operators.
Exercise deployment and customer use do not establish one operational configuration, autonomous engagement authority, or independently verified performance in combat.
Directory record reviewed
13 · Norway
Kongsberg describes NASAMS as an operational network-centric air-defense system delivered to multiple nations. Its Naval Strike Missile is a fielded weapon with manufacturer-described autonomous terminal recognition.
Network-centric operation and terminal recognition do not establish unrestricted target generation or a common control mode across all customers and missions.
Directory record reviewed
14 · Sweden
Saab describes Giraffe AMB D as operationally proven and has documented Giraffe 1X use by French forces during the Paris 2024 Olympics. The family provides radar, C3, and engagement-quality data for defensive networks.
Public company descriptions do not disclose all sensor processing, threat-evaluation logic, operator doctrine, or performance under every environment and configuration.
Directory record reviewed
15 · France
Thales states that TACTICOS is operational in the Polish Navy and numerous other navies. The system functions as a combat-management layer connecting sensors, operator decisions, communications, and weapons.
Operator configurations, algorithms, automation settings, weapon-release authority, and mission performance are not uniform or fully public.
Directory record reviewed
16 · European multinational
MBDA documents Sea Ceptor entering Royal Navy service in 2018 and continuing into additional national programs. The system is part of an operational naval air-defense chain linking ship sensors, command systems, launchers, and active-seeker missiles.
Service entry does not reveal classified engagement logic, target discrimination, intervention mechanisms, or operator-specific employment rules.
Directory record reviewed
17 · Germany
HENSOLDT has documented delivery and operational support of TRML-4D radars for Ukraine, including use within the IRIS-T SLM defensive chain. The company describes the radar as proven in combat conditions.
Company descriptions do not independently verify every engagement, detection claim, software configuration, or current deployment location.
Directory record reviewed
18 · Germany
Diehl documents IRIS-T SLM operational use in Ukraine and deliveries to Germany, Estonia, and other European customers. A fire unit connects radar, tactical operations, launchers, and guided missiles.
Customer-derived performance claims remain attributed. Public sources do not reveal all command logic, engagement criteria, or classified effectiveness data.
Directory record reviewed
19 · Germany / Switzerland
Rheinmetall states that the first Skynex system was delivered to Ukraine in 2023, with another following in 2024, and documents adoption by additional European operators.
Delivery and company-described operational performance do not reveal exact field configurations, control modes, defended locations, or independently audited engagement results.
Directory record reviewed
20 · Estonia
Milrem states that THeMIS has been deployed in Ukraine and verified during Operation Barkhane in Mali. Public demonstrations distinguish autonomous mobility and sensing from human firing authority for weaponized configurations.
A platform’s operational deployment and mobility autonomy do not establish autonomous lethal authority. Payloads, missions, controls, and communications-loss behavior vary by configuration.
Directory record reviewed
No providers match the current filters.
How to read the directory
A provider can participate in a kill chain through radar, networking, software, mission autonomy, terminal recognition, or a defensive effector. Those contributions imply different levels of technical and human authority.
01 · Function
Detect, fuse, communicate, recommend, navigate, recognize, coordinate, engage, or assess are different functions and should not be collapsed into one autonomy label.
02 · Evidence
Government and operator records, procurement notices, manufacturer releases, exercises, and independent reporting carry different evidentiary weight.
03 · Authority
Autonomous navigation or sensor fusion does not establish autonomous engagement. When public sources do not reveal release or abort authority, the directory says so.
04 · Configuration
One product family may have multiple versions, customers, software baselines, mission profiles, and control modes. A company-level record cannot resolve every configuration.
Inclusion method
A company qualifies when a reviewed public source connects a representative technology to at least one fielded system, operational user, delivered capability, documented service entry, or substantial military exercise. The company must also provide a direct official page that helps readers identify the technology or product family.
The directory excludes entries supported only by anonymous marketing aggregation, unauthenticated social posts, patents, aspirational concepts, or procurement rumors. It is not a global market census. Classified suppliers, component subcontractors, newer entrants, and companies whose operational relationship is not publicly documented may be absent.
Corrections should identify the exact company record, the disputed statement, and a stronger source. See the correction method or contact editor@killchains.com.
Continue the research path
Use the system categories to understand function, the Evidence Atlas to inspect public records and unknowns, and the source library to review each supporting record directly.