Bounded simulation: no real targets, coordinates, casualty models, weapon-performance parameters, executable payloads, or operational attack instructions.

Curated external directory · Official links · Evidence labels

Companies providing kill-chain technologies used in real-world operations

Explore publicly documented companies whose products contribute to sensing, tracking, command and control, decision support, defensive interception, autonomy, communications, space, or cyber defense. Inclusion is descriptive—not an endorsement, ranking, procurement recommendation, or claim that every listed product uses AI or autonomous force.

29 companies7 technology categories41 source-bounded relationshipsOfficial and source-linkedNo procurement advice

Answer-first summary

Direct answers

Release 1.8.0 · reviewed · evidence states

Which companies provide kill-chain technologies?

The directory covers publicly documented providers of sensing, intelligence, command and control, decision support, defensive interception, autonomy, communications, space, and cyber-defense technologies.

Read the supporting section

Does inclusion mean KillChains.com endorses a company or product?

No. Inclusion is descriptive and source-based; the directory is not a ranking, buying guide, procurement recommendation, safety certification, or claim of independent performance verification.

Read the supporting section

Does every listed company provide autonomous weapons or military AI?

No. Some provide sensors, communications, cybersecurity, or conventional automation. Each entry separates the documented function from the publicly known human-control arrangement.

Read the supporting section

What this directory shows

Publicly documented contribution to a chain

Entries identify a bounded technology role, public evidence of delivery, fielding, or operational support, the applicable kill-chain stages, and the limits of what open sources establish.

What it does not show

No “best company” or buying guide

The page does not compare prices, rank lethality, recommend products, provide sales contacts, reproduce technical procedures, or imply that a vendor statement independently proves field performance.

How control is described

Functions and authority stay separate

Autonomous navigation, tracking, classification, sensor fusion, and terminal guidance are different from authority to select or engage a target. Unknown operating modes remain labeled as unknown.

Company-to-system relationship explorer

Trace a public technology contribution without turning it into a vendor score.

Each relationship links one reviewed provider to one specific system, program, software platform, sensor family, or bounded product family. Filter by role, function, evidence, or subject, then compare up to four relationships without an overall ranking.

Relationship, not ownership

One system can have several contributors.

A manufacturer, sensor provider, software provider, or integrator may support different parts of the same chain. The explorer does not collapse those roles into one claim.

Evidence stays attached

Attribution does not upgrade a source.

Manufacturer descriptions, government or operator statements, independent analysis, and public unknowns retain their original evidence state.

No commercial score

No ranking, review, or recommendation.

Comparison is limited to documented function, relationship type, evidence state, lifecycle, human-control boundary, unknowns, and source count.

Reset relationship view
41 of 41 relationships shown Reviewed
0 selectedChoose up to four relationships.

Manufacturer · Fielded

AeroVironment

Puma LE small UAS

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
platform family
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackAssess

Human-control boundary

Autonomous flight and sensor task execution do not establish autonomous engagement authority.

Public unknowns

Mission-specific payloads, control links, operator permissions, and current operational configurations are not fully public.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish weapon release, target selection, or one universal operating mode.

Manufacturer · Fielded

AeroVironment

Switchblade 600 family

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
loitering-system family
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Post-launch tracking or terminal functions remain distinct from the human decision that authorizes a particular mission.

Public unknowns

Configuration-specific target-selection, intervention, and abort arrangements are not established by the product page.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not independently verify combat performance or autonomous selection of a new target.

Software provider · Mixed

Anduril Industries

Lattice command-and-control platform

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
software platform
Lifecycle
Mixed
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Command-and-control software can fuse and recommend without itself holding universal authority to use force.

Public unknowns

Deployment-specific model thresholds, role permissions, source weighting, and intervention windows remain undisclosed.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish autonomous weapon release or independent performance verification.

System integrator · Developmental

Anduril Industries

Next-generation counter-UAS fire control

Government or operator statement
Relationship
System integrator
Subject type
integration program
Lifecycle
Developmental
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Selection for a fire-control integration role does not establish the final operator workflow or every response mode.

Public unknowns

The public record does not disclose field configuration, authorization settings, or operational outcomes.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish a fielded universal configuration or unsupervised engagement authority.

Software provider · Fielded

Auterion

Skynode autonomy platform

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
autonomy software family
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
TrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Onboard tracking after a human designation is different from autonomous nomination of a new target.

Public unknowns

System-by-system model, link, intervention, and mission-authority details remain incomplete publicly.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish that software alone authorizes force or selects every target.

Software provider · Fielded

BAE Systems

INTeACT combat-management software

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
combat-management software
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Combat-management automation can correlate and coordinate while final authority remains mission- and operator-specific.

Public unknowns

Current fleet baselines, decision logic, automatic modes, and engagement settings are not public in full.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish one fleet-wide control mode or independent operational effectiveness.

Software provider · Fielded

CrowdStrike

Falcon security platform

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
cyber-defense platform
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Automated cyber response should remain constrained by policy, tenant scope, and human review for consequential action.

Public unknowns

Customer-specific detections, tuning, response rights, retention, and incident outcomes vary.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish universal detection coverage or authorization for unbounded external action.

Manufacturer · Fielded

Diehl Defence

IRIS-T SLM air-defense system

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
defensive system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Integrated air defense can automate tracking and coordination while engagement authority depends on operator configuration and doctrine.

Public unknowns

Operational thresholds, network settings, authorization paths, and independently reviewed performance remain incomplete publicly.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish one customer configuration or automatic engagement in every mode.

Manufacturer · Fielded

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems

MQ-9B SkyGuardian family

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
remotely piloted aircraft family
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Human-control boundary

Remotely piloted and autonomous flight functions do not establish independent weapon-release authority.

Public unknowns

Mission-specific sensor tasking, data sharing, payload, and release procedures are not fully public.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish autonomous force or disclose current operational missions.

Software provider · Fielded

Google Cloud / Mandiant

Google Security Operations and Mandiant services

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
cyber-defense platform and service
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

AI summaries and automated playbooks should remain bounded by deterministic policy and explicit approval for consequential actions.

Public unknowns

Customer-specific telemetry, playbooks, retention, response authority, and incident outcomes vary.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish complete threat coverage or independent comparative effectiveness.

Developer · Mixed

Helsing

HX-2 uncrewed system

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Developer
Subject type
uncrewed-system family
Lifecycle
Mixed
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Company statements describe human involvement in critical decisions; the implementation remains mission-specific.

Public unknowns

Independent validation, exact control modes, model behavior, intervention paths, and field configurations remain incomplete.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not independently verify operational performance or one universal authority model.

Sensor provider · Fielded

HENSOLDT

TRML-4D radar

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Sensor provider
Subject type
sensor system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Human-control boundary

Radar tracking and target acquisition do not determine who authorizes an interceptor or external effect.

Public unknowns

Detailed performance, classification logic, network connections, and operating procedures remain nonpublic.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish engagement authority, deployment location, or independently audited performance.

System integrator · Fielded

Israel Aerospace Industries / ELTA

BARAK MX air and missile defense

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
System integrator
Subject type
integrated defensive system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Integrated defensive functions remain subject to operator doctrine, configuration, and mission-specific authorization.

Public unknowns

Mode-specific logic, thresholds, intervention paths, and customer configurations are not public in full.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not independently verify performance or establish one automatic operating mode.

Sensor provider · Fielded

Israel Aerospace Industries / ELTA

ELM-2084 Multi-Mission Radar

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Sensor provider
Subject type
sensor system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Human-control boundary

A radar can detect, track, and support fire control without itself authorizing an engagement.

Public unknowns

Deployment-specific signal processing, fusion, network connections, and operator workflow are not fully public.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish who controls an effector or the settings used by a customer.

Manufacturer · Fielded

Israel Aerospace Industries / ELTA

HARPY

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
Anti-radiation loitering munition
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackEngage / respond

Human-control boundary

Manufacturer material describes autonomous search and engagement after activation within an emitting-target mission class.

Public unknowns

Public sources do not fully disclose safeguards, abort mechanisms, ambiguous-emitter handling, or operator doctrine.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish open-ended target selection, anti-personnel use, or every operator configuration.

System integrator · Fielded

Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace

NASAMS air-defense system

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
System integrator
Subject type
integrated defensive system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Air-defense integration can automate data flow and response coordination while human authority remains configuration-specific.

Public unknowns

Customer-specific doctrine, permissions, network connections, and response settings remain incomplete publicly.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish one universal firing mode or independently verified performance.

Software provider · Fielded

Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace

NASAMS Fire Distribution Center

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
command-and-control software
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

The Fire Distribution Center supports command, correlation, and allocation; it does not by itself define engagement authority.

Public unknowns

Detailed recommendation logic, role permissions, and deployment-specific integrations are nonpublic.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish autonomous release or disclose customer operating procedures.

Manufacturer · Fielded

Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace

Naval Strike Missile

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
Missile system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackEngage / respond

Human-control boundary

Terminal recognition after pre-launch mission authorization is not unrestricted generation of a new target.

Public unknowns

Recognition thresholds, candidate-set rules, intervention capability, and configuration-specific behavior remain nonpublic.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish open-ended autonomous target selection or a universal abort arrangement.

System integrator · Fielded

L3Harris Technologies

Resilient tactical communications and data links

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
System integrator
Subject type
communications family
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Human-control boundary

Communications and data links transport evidence and commands but do not themselves determine whether force is authorized.

Public unknowns

Network topology, encryption details, mission routing, resilience, and operator procedures are not fully public.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish engagement authority or disclose operational network design.

System integrator · Fielded

Leonardo

Leonardo command-and-control systems

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
System integrator
Subject type
command-and-control family
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Command-and-control integration can support recommendations and coordination while authority remains role- and mission-specific.

Public unknowns

Deployment-specific decision logic, permissions, and intervention mechanisms remain nonpublic.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish autonomous force or independently verified operational outcomes.

Sensor provider · Fielded

Leonardo

Leonardo radar and sensor portfolio

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Sensor provider
Subject type
sensor family
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Human-control boundary

Sensing and target acquisition remain distinct from authorization and external effect.

Public unknowns

System-specific performance, algorithms, network integration, and customer procedures are not public in full.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish autonomous firing or one common configuration across the portfolio.

System integrator · Fielded

Lockheed Martin

Aegis Combat System

Government or operator statement
Relationship
System integrator
Subject type
combat-system family
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Aegis combines sensors, command functions, and defensive effectors; operating mode and authority remain mission-specific.

Public unknowns

Detailed doctrine statements, thresholds, crew permissions, software baselines, and incident modes are not public in full.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish that every engagement is automatic or that every function uses machine learning.

Manufacturer · Fielded

MBDA

Sea Ceptor air-defense system

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
defensive system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
TrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Automated tracking and guidance remain subject to the command system and operator-defined authorization state.

Public unknowns

Detailed seeker behavior, command settings, customer doctrine, and independently reviewed performance remain incomplete publicly.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish one universal autonomy or engagement mode.

Software provider · Fielded

Microsoft Security

Microsoft Sentinel

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
cyber-defense platform
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Automated cyber investigation and playbooks should remain constrained by tenant policy and human review for consequential action.

Public unknowns

Customer-specific data, tuning, retention, approvals, response authority, and incident outcomes vary.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish complete detection coverage or permission for unbounded external action.

Manufacturer · Demonstrated

Milrem Robotics

THeMIS Combat UGV

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
Uncrewed ground vehicle
Lifecycle
Demonstrated
Sources
3 reviewed records
FindTrackTarget / decideEngage / respond

Human-control boundary

Public descriptions distinguish autonomous mobility from human-controlled weapon functions in selected configurations.

Public unknowns

Payload, control-link, lost-communications, software, and customer-specific authority arrangements remain variable.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish autonomous weapon release or one universal THeMIS configuration.

Software provider · Fielded

mPrest Systems

Iron Dome battle-management and weapon-control software

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
battle-management software
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Battle-management software can calculate, prioritize, and coordinate while the human authorization arrangement remains deployment-specific.

Public unknowns

Detailed algorithms, thresholds, launcher assignment, operator permissions, and fallback modes are nonpublic.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish one universal Iron Dome authorization mode or independent performance verification.

System integrator · Fielded

Northrop Grumman

Integrated Battle Command System

Government or operator statement
Relationship
System integrator
Subject type
integrated battle-management system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
3 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Integrated sensor-to-effector coordination does not establish that every function uses AI or that firing is autonomous.

Public unknowns

Track-fusion logic, role permissions, engagement settings, software baselines, and deployment-specific networks remain nonpublic.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish universal automation, machine-learning use, or independent performance results.

Software provider · Fielded

Palantir Technologies

Maven Smart System

Government or operator statement
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
Program / decision-support system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decide

Human-control boundary

Decision support, evidence fusion, and target nomination remain upstream of the authority that approves an external effect.

Public unknowns

Model thresholds, source weighting, user workflow, integration details, and error rates are not fully public.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish independent weapon release or that software recommendations are ground truth.

Software provider · Developmental

Palantir Technologies

Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node

Government or operator statement
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
intelligence-fusion program
Lifecycle
Developmental
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Human-control boundary

AI/ML-enabled intelligence fusion supports analysts and commanders; it does not by itself authorize force.

Public unknowns

Prototype behavior, model details, source reconciliation, operator workflow, and final field configuration remain incomplete publicly.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish a fielded autonomous targeting system or independent engagement authority.

Software provider · Fielded

Palo Alto Networks

Cortex XSIAM

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
cyber-defense platform
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Autonomous or agentic security operations should remain bounded by policy, scope, and approval for consequential action.

Public unknowns

Customer-specific automation, detection coverage, approval gates, and incident outcomes are not established by general product material.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish universal effectiveness or authorization for unbounded external response.

Manufacturer · Fielded

Quantum Systems

Vector AI reconnaissance UAS

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
reconnaissance platform family
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Human-control boundary

Reconnaissance and target-acquisition support do not establish autonomous engagement authority.

Public unknowns

Payloads, software versions, control modes, deployment details, and target workflows remain incomplete publicly.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish weapon release, operational location, or independently reviewed effectiveness.

System integrator · Fielded

Rafael Advanced Defense Systems

Iron Dome defensive system

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
System integrator
Subject type
integrated defensive system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Iron Dome is highly automated and configurable; public sources do not establish one authorization arrangement for every deployment and mode.

Public unknowns

Detailed thresholds, assignment rules, override arrangements, operating settings, and independently reviewed performance remain incomplete.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish universal full autonomy or independently validate every performance statement.

Manufacturer · Fielded

Rafael Advanced Defense Systems

SPICE 250

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
Precision weapon system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FixTrackEngage / respond

Human-control boundary

Terminal recognition and guidance after human mission selection are different from open-ended generation of a new target.

Public unknowns

Classifier behavior, intervention, retargeting, customer settings, and current mission configurations remain nonpublic.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish unrestricted target selection or one universal post-release control mode.

Manufacturer · Fielded

RTX / Raytheon

MK 15 Phalanx CIWS

Government or operator statement
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
terminal-defense system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Phalanx can complete a bounded automatic local-defense sequence while remaining within an operator and command structure.

Public unknowns

Named-incident mode, crew settings, thresholds, doctrine, and software behavior are usually not disclosed publicly.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish that every use was unsupervised or that core logic depends on machine learning.

System integrator · Fielded

RTX / Raytheon

NASAMS air-defense system

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
System integrator
Subject type
integrated defensive system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
TrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Interceptor and system integration remain governed by the NASAMS command architecture and operator-defined permissions.

Public unknowns

Customer-specific doctrine, command settings, network integration, and intervention paths remain incomplete publicly.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish autonomous release or one common configuration across operators.

Manufacturer · Fielded

RTX / Raytheon

SeaRAM ship-defense system

Government or operator statement
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
terminal-defense system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

SeaRAM is a bounded defensive system; exact automatic and supervised settings remain operator-specific.

Public unknowns

Mode selection, crew permissions, thresholds, software baselines, and named-incident control settings are not public in full.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish one universal operating mode or independent performance measurement.

Software provider · Fielded

Saab

9AIR C4I

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
air-defense command software
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Air-defense command software coordinates information and action while authorization remains mission- and user-specific.

Public unknowns

Integration details, operator roles, automatic modes, thresholds, and customer procedures are nonpublic.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish universal engagement authority or independent performance verification.

Sensor provider · Fielded

Saab

Giraffe radar and C4I family

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Sensor provider
Subject type
sensor and command family
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Human-control boundary

Radar and C4I can support detection, fusion, and cueing without establishing engagement authority.

Public unknowns

National configurations, algorithms, permissions, performance, and current operating states are not public in full.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish autonomous firing or one standard configuration across customers.

Manufacturer · Fielded

Shield AI

V-BAT uncrewed aircraft

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Manufacturer
Subject type
uncrewed-aircraft family
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
2 reviewed records
FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Human-control boundary

Autonomous flight and ISR task execution do not establish independent weapon-release authority.

Public unknowns

Mission-specific autonomy, payload, intervention, data-link, and operational-performance details remain incomplete publicly.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish autonomous force or disclose current operational tasking.

Software provider · Fielded

Splunk

Splunk Enterprise Security

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
Software provider
Subject type
cyber-defense platform
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Progressive cyber automation should retain approval and policy boundaries for consequential response actions.

Public unknowns

Customer-specific data, detection tuning, playbooks, human approval, and incident outcomes are not established by a general product page.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish complete detection coverage or authorization for unbounded external action.

System integrator · Fielded

Thales

TACTICOS naval combat-management system

Manufacturer-described
Relationship
System integrator
Subject type
combat-management system
Lifecycle
Fielded
Sources
1 reviewed record
FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Human-control boundary

Combat-management integration can automate correlation and coordination without defining one engagement-authority model.

Public unknowns

Fleet configurations, thresholds, permissions, source code, operating modes, and deployment details are not public in full.

What this relationship does not establish

This relationship does not establish autonomous firing or independent operational effectiveness.

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29 of 29 companies shown Reviewed

01 · North America

AeroVironment

United States

Manufacturer-described
Sensing & ISRAutonomy & robotics

Publicly documented role

Provides uncrewed aircraft and loitering systems that support reconnaissance, tracking, communications relay, and bounded post-launch mission execution.

Representative technologies

  • Puma LE small UAS
  • Switchblade loitering systems
  • Distributed uncrewed-system control

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Company-controlled product material describes fielded systems used by U.S. and allied operators. Exact mission configurations and engagement-authority arrangements vary and are not completely public.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Autonomous flight, tracking, or terminal functions do not by themselves establish who authorizes a particular use of force.

What remains unknown

Current software baselines, operator doctrine, target-selection authority, abort behavior, and deployment-specific performance are not fully public.

02 · North America

Anduril Industries

United States

Government or operator statement
Command, control & fusionDecision support & softwareAutonomy & roboticsDefensive interception

Publicly documented role

Builds command-and-control software, sensor integration, counter-UAS systems, and autonomous platforms intended to connect detection, tracking, decision support, and response.

Representative technologies

  • Lattice command and control
  • Counter-UAS fire control
  • Ghost uncrewed aircraft
  • Next Generation Command and Control prototyping

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

U.S. Army sources document Anduril selections and prototyping for counter-UAS fire control, reconnaissance systems, and Next Generation Command and Control.

Government or operator statement: A public government, military service, program office, or operator source documents selection, delivery, fielding, or operational use.

Human-control boundary

Public selection or field use does not establish one universal autonomy or weapons-release mode across products and missions.

What remains unknown

Deployment-specific rules, software thresholds, operator permissions, intervention windows, and classified integrations remain undisclosed.

03 · North America / Europe

Auterion

United States / Switzerland

Manufacturer-described
Autonomy & roboticsDecision support & software

Publicly documented role

Provides onboard autonomy and mission software for uncrewed systems, including navigation, tracking, and terminal guidance functions.

Representative technologies

  • Skynode edge computing
  • Autonomy software
  • Networked uncrewed-system coordination

Kill-chain functions

TrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Company announcements describe government-funded delivery of autonomy kits for Ukrainian uncrewed systems. The directory treats those statements as company-reported operational evidence.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Autonomous terminal tracking after a human designation is not the same as autonomous selection of a new target.

What remains unknown

System-by-system authorization, intervention, data-link, model, and operational-effectiveness details are incomplete publicly.

04 · Europe

BAE Systems

United Kingdom

Manufacturer-described
Command, control & fusionDecision support & softwareSpace & communications

Publicly documented role

Provides naval combat-management and mission-system software that combines sensor information, command decisions, and effector coordination.

Representative technologies

  • INTeACT combat management
  • Naval combat systems
  • Mission-system integration

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Company material describes INTeACT and related combat-management systems as supporting Royal Navy and allied naval operations.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

A combat-management system can automate correlation and coordination while engagement authority remains mission- and operator-specific.

What remains unknown

Current fleet configurations, decision logic, automation modes, and interface behavior in specific operations are not public in full.

05 · Global commercial cyber

CrowdStrike

United States

Manufacturer-described
Cyber defenseDecision support & software

Publicly documented role

Provides security telemetry, cross-domain detection, investigation, threat intelligence, and automated response used to identify and interrupt cyber intrusion chains.

Representative technologies

  • Falcon platform
  • Endpoint detection and response
  • Threat intelligence
  • Automated response

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

The company describes the Falcon platform as a production security platform used for endpoint, identity, cloud, SIEM, threat-hunting, and response workflows.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Automated security response should remain constrained by policy, scope, and human review for consequential actions.

What remains unknown

Customer-specific coverage, tuning, response authority, incident outcomes, and independent comparative effectiveness are not established by the product page.

06 · Europe

Diehl Defence

Germany

Manufacturer-described
Defensive interceptionCommand, control & fusion

Publicly documented role

Provides ground-based air-defense systems that combine radar, command-and-control, launchers, and interceptors.

Representative technologies

  • IRIS-T SLM air defense
  • Integrated fire units
  • Air-defense system integration

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Company and customer-controlled public material documents IRIS-T SLM delivery and operational use by national armed forces.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Delivery and use do not disclose every authorization setting, threat-evaluation rule, or human intervention path.

What remains unknown

Operational thresholds, engagement doctrine, network configurations, and independently audited performance remain incomplete publicly.

07 · North America

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems

United States

Manufacturer-described
Sensing & ISRAutonomy & roboticsSpace & communications

Publicly documented role

Provides long-endurance remotely piloted aircraft and mission systems for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, tracking, and communications support.

Representative technologies

  • MQ-9B SkyGuardian
  • Persistent ISR
  • Remotely piloted aircraft
  • Airborne communications relay

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Public operational evidence

Company and operator announcements document MQ-9B acquisition and operational introduction by allied air forces.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Remotely piloted or autonomous flight functions do not establish autonomous weapons-release authority.

What remains unknown

Mission-specific control arrangements, sensor tasking, data-sharing, weapon-release procedures, and current operational deployments are not fully public.

08 · Global commercial cyber

Google Cloud / Mandiant

United States

Manufacturer-described
Cyber defenseDecision support & software

Publicly documented role

Provides telemetry analytics, threat intelligence, detection, investigation, security orchestration, validation, and incident-response services for cyber-defense operations.

Representative technologies

  • Google Security Operations
  • Mandiant threat intelligence
  • Threat hunting
  • Security orchestration and response

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Google describes SecOps and Mandiant services as production platforms and expert-led operations for detecting, investigating, validating, and responding to real cyber threats.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Automated playbooks and AI recommendations should not be treated as independent authorization for destructive or externally consequential actions.

What remains unknown

Customer-specific detections, playbooks, retention, response authority, and incident outcomes vary and are not established by general product material.

09 · Europe

Helsing

Germany / United Kingdom

Manufacturer-described
Autonomy & roboticsDecision support & software

Publicly documented role

Develops AI-enabled defense software and uncrewed systems intended to operate under communications constraints with declared human involvement in critical decisions.

Representative technologies

  • HX-2 uncrewed system
  • AI mission software
  • Human-supervised autonomy

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Company statements describe frontline approval and delivery of systems for Ukraine. Those statements remain manufacturer-provided evidence.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

The company states that humans remain in or on the loop for critical decisions; public sources do not reveal every mission-specific implementation.

What remains unknown

Independent operational validation, detailed control modes, model behavior, intervention paths, and mission configuration are incomplete publicly.

10 · Europe

HENSOLDT

Germany

Manufacturer-described
Sensing & ISRDefensive interception

Publicly documented role

Provides radar and sensor systems that detect, track, and support target acquisition for air-defense networks.

Representative technologies

  • TRML-4D radar
  • Air-surveillance radar
  • Target acquisition

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Public operational evidence

Company reporting documents delivery and operational use of TRML-4D radars in Ukraine and other European air-defense programs.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Radar tracking and target acquisition do not establish who authorizes an interceptor or how a fire-control network is configured.

What remains unknown

Deployment locations, detailed performance, classification logic, network connections, and current operating procedures are not public in full.

11 · Middle East

Israel Aerospace Industries / ELTA

Israel

Manufacturer-described
Sensing & ISRCommand, control & fusionDefensive interceptionAutonomy & robotics

Publicly documented role

Provides radar, air-defense, command-and-control, and autonomous-system technologies spanning detection through engagement.

Representative technologies

  • ELM-2084 multi-mission radar
  • BARAK MX air defense
  • HARPY loitering munition
  • Battle-management integration

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Official company product pages describe operational radar and defense systems; HARPY is manufacturer-described as autonomously seeking and striking emitting targets after activation.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

One company supplies systems with very different authority arrangements. Radar automation, air-defense integration, and autonomous target-profile matching must not be collapsed into one label.

What remains unknown

Operator-specific modes, safeguards, thresholds, abort mechanisms, current deployments, and independent performance evidence vary and remain incomplete.

12 · Europe

Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace

Norway

Manufacturer-described
Command, control & fusionDefensive interceptionAutonomy & robotics

Publicly documented role

Provides air-defense command and control, interceptor integration, and missiles with bounded post-launch target-recognition functions.

Representative technologies

  • NASAMS
  • Fire Distribution Center
  • Naval Strike Missile
  • Integrated air and missile defense

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Company and operator material documents NASAMS fielding and NSM use by multiple armed forces.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

NASAMS command-and-control and NSM terminal recognition involve different human-control questions. Neither should be generalized into unrestricted autonomous target selection.

What remains unknown

Operator-specific firing doctrine, terminal recognition logic, intervention capabilities, and deployment configurations are not completely public.

13 · North America

L3Harris Technologies

United States

Manufacturer-described
Space & communicationsSensing & ISRCommand, control & fusion

Publicly documented role

Provides resilient communications, tactical data links, space and airborne sensing, and mission systems that move observations and commands across distributed operations.

Representative technologies

  • Resilient tactical communications
  • Link 16
  • Space payloads
  • ISR mission systems

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Public operational evidence

Company material describes fielded tactical communications and network products used by U.S. and allied forces.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

A communications or data-link provider enables information exchange; it does not determine the legality or authority of downstream actions.

What remains unknown

Network configurations, encryption, node locations, mission data, operational availability, and specific command relationships are not public and are intentionally excluded.

14 · Europe

Leonardo

Italy

Manufacturer-described
Sensing & ISRCommand, control & fusionDefensive interception

Publicly documented role

Provides radars, sensors, command-and-control, and mission-system integration for air, land, naval, and joint operations.

Representative technologies

  • Command and control
  • Air-surveillance radar
  • Electronic sensing
  • Mission systems

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Company-controlled material describes C2 and radar systems used in national and multinational exercises and operational architectures.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Sensor fusion and C2 support do not establish autonomous engagement authority or one universal human-machine workflow.

What remains unknown

Software baselines, national configurations, weapons-release authority, performance, and operational data remain incomplete publicly.

15 · North America

Lockheed Martin

United States

Government or operator statement
Command, control & fusionDecision support & softwareDefensive interceptionSpace & communicationsCyber defense

Publicly documented role

Provides combat systems, sensors, command-and-control integration, missiles, space systems, and the foundational seven-stage Cyber Kill Chain framework.

Representative technologies

  • Aegis Combat System
  • Integrated air and missile defense
  • Space and sensor systems
  • Cyber Kill Chain framework

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

U.S. Navy sources document Aegis as a deployed automated command-and-control and weapons-control system installed across active surface combatants.

Government or operator statement: A public government, military service, program office, or operator source documents selection, delivery, fielding, or operational use.

Human-control boundary

Aegis supports several modes and missions. Public architecture does not establish that every engagement is fully automatic or AI-driven.

What remains unknown

Current software baselines, doctrine statements, automation settings, thresholds, crew permissions, and classified integrations remain nonpublic.

16 · Europe

MBDA

European multinational

Manufacturer-described
Defensive interceptionCommand, control & fusion

Publicly documented role

Provides guided weapons and air-defense systems integrated into naval and land command-and-control networks.

Representative technologies

  • CAMM family
  • Sea Ceptor
  • Air-defense integration

Kill-chain functions

TrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Company and operator material documents Sea Ceptor entry into Royal Navy service and integration with combat-management systems.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Guidance and integration do not disclose who authorizes every engagement or what automation mode is used in a specific operation.

What remains unknown

Engagement doctrine, detailed seeker behavior, command settings, deployment locations, and independently audited performance are not fully public.

17 · Global commercial cyber

Microsoft Security

United States

Manufacturer-described
Cyber defenseDecision support & software

Publicly documented role

Provides SIEM, XDR, threat intelligence, investigation, and response tooling used by security operations centers to detect and interrupt cyberattack progression.

Representative technologies

  • Microsoft Sentinel
  • Microsoft Defender XDR
  • Security Copilot
  • SOAR and threat intelligence

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Microsoft describes Sentinel and Defender as production security platforms for multi-cloud and multiplatform detection, investigation, orchestration, and response.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

AI summaries and automated playbooks should remain subject to deterministic policy, least privilege, and human review for consequential actions.

What remains unknown

Customer-specific configurations, detection coverage, retention, response authority, and incident outcomes are not established by a general product page.

18 · Europe

Milrem Robotics

Estonia

Manufacturer-described
Autonomy & roboticsSensing & ISR

Publicly documented role

Provides uncrewed ground vehicles used for logistics, reconnaissance, casualty evacuation, route clearance, and payload integration.

Representative technologies

  • THeMIS UGV family
  • Autonomous mobility
  • Logistics and reconnaissance
  • Payload integration

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Company announcements document THeMIS deliveries and use in Ukraine. The public record supports operational deployment of the platform, not one universal weapon-control mode.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Milrem has publicly distinguished autonomous mobility from human-controlled weapon functions in selected configurations.

What remains unknown

Configuration-specific autonomy, payload, control-link, lost-communications, and engagement-authority arrangements remain variable and incompletely public.

19 · Middle East

mPrest Systems

Israel

Manufacturer-described
Command, control & fusionDecision support & softwareDefensive interception

Publicly documented role

Provides battle-management and command-and-control software for real-time sensor fusion, threat evaluation, resource coordination, and operational response.

Representative technologies

  • Iron Dome battle management
  • Real-time C4I
  • Sensor fusion
  • Operational decision support

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

mPrest publicly identifies itself as the developer of the Iron Dome battle-management and weapon-control software and describes defense deployments of its C4I platform.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Public material does not establish one universal human authorization arrangement for Iron Dome or other deployments.

What remains unknown

Detailed algorithms, confidence thresholds, launcher-assignment rules, operator permissions, and deployment-specific fallback modes remain nonpublic.

20 · North America

Northrop Grumman

United States

Government or operator statement
Command, control & fusionDefensive interceptionSensing & ISRSpace & communications

Publicly documented role

Provides integrated battle management, sensors, and mission systems that connect distributed observations to defensive command-and-control and effectors.

Representative technologies

  • Integrated Battle Command System
  • Air and missile defense integration
  • Space and airborne sensors

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

U.S. Army sources document IBCS initial operational capability, full-rate production approval, and delivery to the force.

Government or operator statement: A public government, military service, program office, or operator source documents selection, delivery, fielding, or operational use.

Human-control boundary

“Any sensor, best shooter” integration does not establish that machine learning is used in every function or that firing is autonomous.

What remains unknown

Track-fusion logic, operator permissions, engagement settings, software baselines, and deployment-specific networks remain nonpublic.

21 · North America

Palantir Technologies

United States

Government or operator statement
Decision support & softwareCommand, control & fusionSensing & ISR

Publicly documented role

Provides data integration, geospatial workflow, intelligence fusion, and decision-support software used by defense and security organizations.

Representative technologies

  • Gotham
  • Maven Smart System integration
  • TITAN prototype software
  • Data fusion and operational workflows

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Public operational evidence

Official U.S. sources document Palantir involvement in Project Maven and the Army TITAN prototype program.

Government or operator statement: A public government, military service, program office, or operator source documents selection, delivery, fielding, or operational use.

Human-control boundary

Decision support, target nomination, and workflow integration do not by themselves establish independent weapons-release authority.

What remains unknown

Model thresholds, source weighting, operator workflow, current deployments, integration details, and error rates are not fully public.

22 · Global commercial cyber

Palo Alto Networks

United States

Manufacturer-described
Cyber defenseDecision support & software

Publicly documented role

Provides a security-operations platform that centralizes telemetry, correlates attacks, prioritizes cases, guides investigations, and automates bounded response workflows.

Representative technologies

  • Cortex XSIAM
  • XDR
  • SOAR
  • Threat intelligence and incident response

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

The company describes Cortex XSIAM as a production SOC platform used by commercial and public organizations for detection, investigation, and response.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Autonomous or agentic SOC features should not be treated as authorization for unbounded external action; human and policy guardrails remain material.

What remains unknown

Customer-specific automation, approval gates, detection coverage, incident outcomes, and independent performance are not established by product marketing.

23 · Europe

Quantum Systems

Germany

Manufacturer-described
Sensing & ISRAutonomy & robotics

Publicly documented role

Provides electric vertical-takeoff reconnaissance aircraft and software for mapping, surveillance, and target-acquisition support.

Representative technologies

  • Vector AI reconnaissance UAS
  • Automated mapping
  • ISR data collection

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Public operational evidence

Company statements document repeated government orders and operational use of Vector systems in Ukraine.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Reconnaissance and target-acquisition support do not establish autonomous weapon release or engagement authority.

What remains unknown

Current payloads, software versions, deployment locations, target workflows, control modes, and independent effectiveness data are incomplete publicly.

24 · Middle East

Rafael Advanced Defense Systems

Israel

Manufacturer-described
Defensive interceptionCommand, control & fusionAutonomy & robotics

Publicly documented role

Provides defensive interception, active protection, guidance, and battle-management technologies spanning sensing through assessment.

Representative technologies

  • Iron Dome
  • SPICE guidance family
  • Trophy active protection
  • Air-defense integration

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Rafael product pages describe operational systems including Iron Dome and SPICE. Performance figures on company pages remain manufacturer claims unless independently corroborated.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Highly automated defense, terminal guidance, and active protection are distinct functions with different operator roles and target contexts.

What remains unknown

Deployment-specific authorization, thresholds, override arrangements, detailed logic, and independently audited performance are not fully public.

25 · North America

RTX / Raytheon

United States

Government or operator statement
Defensive interceptionSensing & ISRCommand, control & fusion

Publicly documented role

Provides radar, air and missile defense, terminal defense, interceptors, and command-and-control components used by U.S. and allied forces.

Representative technologies

  • Phalanx CIWS
  • SeaRAM
  • NASAMS
  • Patriot and radar systems

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

U.S. Navy sources document Phalanx and SeaRAM deployment; company and operator material documents NASAMS and Patriot fielding.

Government or operator statement: A public government, military service, program office, or operator source documents selection, delivery, fielding, or operational use.

Human-control boundary

Phalanx can complete a bounded automatic defensive sequence, while other RTX systems use different command and authorization arrangements.

What remains unknown

Mode-specific operation, local doctrine, software thresholds, crew permissions, and named-incident control settings are usually not public.

26 · Europe

Saab

Sweden

Manufacturer-described
Sensing & ISRCommand, control & fusionDefensive interception

Publicly documented role

Provides radar, air-defense command-and-control, and naval combat-management systems used by national and allied forces.

Representative technologies

  • Giraffe radar and C4I
  • 9AIR C4I
  • 9LV naval combat management

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Company material describes operational deployments and integration of Giraffe, 9AIR, and 9LV systems.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Detection, track fusion, and engagement coordination do not establish autonomous firing or one universal operator workflow.

What remains unknown

National configurations, fire-control permissions, integration details, performance, and current operational states are not public in full.

27 · North America

Shield AI

United States

Manufacturer-described
Autonomy & roboticsSensing & ISR

Publicly documented role

Provides autonomy software and uncrewed aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, and mission execution.

Representative technologies

  • V-BAT
  • Hivemind autonomy
  • Expeditionary ISR

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideAssess

Public operational evidence

Company reporting documents V-BAT operations with the Royal Netherlands Navy and other government users.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Autonomous flight and ISR task execution do not establish independent weapon-release authority.

What remains unknown

Mission-specific autonomy, payload, human-control, data-link, intervention, and operational-performance details are not fully public.

28 · Global commercial cyber

Splunk

United States

Manufacturer-described
Cyber defenseDecision support & software

Publicly documented role

Provides security data analytics, detection, investigation, orchestration, and response capabilities used by security operations centers.

Representative technologies

  • Splunk Enterprise Security
  • SIEM
  • UEBA
  • SOAR
  • AI-assisted triage

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Splunk describes Enterprise Security as a production SIEM and security-operations platform combining detection, investigation, response, and progressive automation.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Progressive automation and agentic features should retain explicit approval and policy boundaries for consequential actions.

What remains unknown

Customer-specific data, tuning, coverage, playbooks, human approval, and incident outcomes are not established by a general product page.

29 · Europe

Thales

France

Manufacturer-described
Command, control & fusionSensing & ISRSpace & communicationsCyber defense

Publicly documented role

Provides naval combat-management, sensors, communications, space, and cyber technologies used by national and allied operators.

Representative technologies

  • TACTICOS naval combat management
  • Radar and sensors
  • Tactical communications
  • Cyber defense

Kill-chain functions

FindFixTrackTarget / decideEngage / respondAssess

Public operational evidence

Company material describes TACTICOS as an operational naval combat-management system used across multiple fleets.

Manufacturer-described: The company publicly describes the capability or operational use. This is not independent performance verification.

Human-control boundary

Combat-management integration can automate detection, correlation, and coordination without establishing one engagement-authority model.

What remains unknown

Fleet-specific configurations, source code, thresholds, permissions, operating modes, and deployment details are not public in full.

Editorial method

Inclusion and relationships require bounded roles and public source trails.

A company appears only when reviewed public material supports a role in a military, defensive, intelligence, communications, space, autonomy, command-and-control, or cyber-defense chain and the entry can preserve the distinction among official operator evidence, company self-description, independent analysis, and unknowns.

The relationship explorer adds a second layer: each relationship must resolve to a reviewed company, a current Atlas system or bounded product-family record, and at least one current source record. It records functions, lifecycle, human-control boundaries, unknowns, and what the relationship does not establish.

Presence in this directory is not a safety certification, legal conclusion, investment opinion, endorsement, export-control assessment, procurement recommendation, or proof that every listed product is currently operational. Product availability, ownership, program status, and deployment can change; use the linked source trail and review date.